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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The environmental movement is currently one of the
most influential forces in political life.

Despite initial

successes, however, it has not yet clearly articulated its
various goals.

Until such an articulation is made, there

is some justification to the charge that "everyone is an
environmentalist."

This paper will attempt to suggest how

these various goals might be clarified, and why such a
clarification is necessary.
The environmental movement is a subtle blend of two
distinctly different impulses.
culturally prescriptive.

One of those impulses is

Its goal is to reform those

dominant cultural values requiring a highly consumptive
life-style and its associated environmental impacts.

A

second impulse is to realize those existent cultural values
which have traditionally held a natural environment in
fairly high regard.
promoting new values

The distinction just made is between
and effecting popular values which

have been thwarted by unresponsive institutions.
This distinction may seem obscure when observing the
day-to-day actions of environmentalists.

The importance of

making the distinction between reforming cultural values,
and effecting existing ones becomes more apparent when one
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reviews past American political movements, e.g., populism,
progressivism, the New Deal, the Civil Rights and the anti
war movements.

All have been characterized by the subtle

blend of prescriptive and popular impulses suggested above.
Past movements have generally combined a disaffected
general public with activist minorities whose own cultural
values were distinct from those popular.

The concern

binding the two elements was their mutually injured
interests, not a shared sense of values.

The outcome of

these movements was the demise of the more visionary minor
ity soon after the interests of the larger public were
secured and general interest in the once unifying issue
waned.^

Historians have blamed the demise of the more

visionary minority elements on their failure to clearly
distinguish their own unique values from those of the
disaffected general public.

Instead of articulating those

values, and clearly acting in their name, the minority
elements were content to ride the coattails of the popular
disaffection.

When the general public’s disaffection ended,

the visionary elements were unable to give their values
adequate public expression.
Although the environmental movement is currently one
of the most influential forces in American politics, it
seems indifferent to the pitfalls which ended earlier move
*Christopher Lasch, The Agony of the American Left
(New York: Alfred A. KnopT^ 1969), p. 18.
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ments.

The distinction between prescriptive and popular

environmentalism is neither philosophically or sociologically
clear.

Until it explains what its alternative "environ

mental values" are, and how they can be achieved, the .
culturally prescriptive impulse of the environmental move
ment seems likely to succumb to a fate similar to that of
its counterparts in earlier movements.
This paper will use preservation controversies as a
heuristic device for exploring the prescriptive and popular
impulses in the environmental movement.

It will argue

that preservation controversies provide issues that, if
properly perceived, prevent the prescriptive impulse of the
environmental movement from being neglected.
How this is possible will be explained more fully in
the following chapters.

As a preview, the unique role of

preservation issues within the environmental movement can
be credited to their intractability.

The visionary

minority's hopes for preserving natural environments, and
popular demands for increased consumption constitute two
mutually exclusive demands within the same broad movement.
Indeed, it is the only environmental issue which is divisive
along prescriptive and popular lines.

By forcing the

distinction between the two impulses to be made, preser
vation controversies force the visionary element of the
environmental movement to come to grips with its own distinct
values.
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In summary, this paper has two chief objects.

It hopes

to analyze the larger environmental movement, and to explain
the role of preservation within that larger movement.
Chapter Two will explore the ambiguous role played by
preservation within the environmental movement.

A review of

the statements of various "environmentalists" suggests,
for example, that some consider preservation a peripheral
and vulnerable concern.

This paper will argue that the

resulting ambiguity has two causes:

the failure of the

environmentalists to recognize the existence of differing
goals and principles within the environmental movement, and
the failure of preservationists to construct a rational and
consistent defense of their actions which keeps these
differences in mind.
The following two chapters will explore these causes
further.

Chapter Three will discuss and criticize the

philosophies of those who have criticized preservation, and
suggest that those philosophies are themselves inadequate.
Chapter Four will suggest the outlines of a rational and
consistent defense of preservation.

Finally, Chapter Five

will reevaluate the role of preservation in the light of
the discussions of Chapters Three and Four.

Using historical

analogies it will conclude that preservation should be seen
as a central and relatively invulnerable concern of the
environmental movement.
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It should be cautioned that these objects are not
achieved through an empirical study of the environmental
movement.

What follows is an attempt to construct a

conceptual framework which has proved useful in under
standing past movements, and an application of that frame
work to the environmental movement.

A sociological study

of the environmental movement which employs the distinctions
developed here might be a promising project but is beyond
the scope of this paper.
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CHAPTER

II

PRESERVATION AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT
The chief concerns of the environmental movement have
been focused on two broad sets of problems:

the pollution

of landscape, air, and water, and the preservation of
unique natural environments.

Of these two problem areas,

the former has received the bulk of public and scholarly
attention.^

The latter, although occasionally provoking an

emotional public debate, has, over the past several years,
been shunted to the side of the larger environmental movement
On Earth Day 1970, inaugural day for the modern wave of
environmentalism, the preservation of urban and nonurban
natural environments was not included on the roster of issues.
This peripheral role was a far cry from the early 1960's,
when preservation was a prominent component of the
environmental movement.^
*John Warren Duffield, "Wilderness: A Political and
Economic Analysis" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University,
1974), p. 10.
^Michael McCloskey, "Wilderness Movement at the Cross
roads, 1945-1970," Pacific Historical Review 41 (1972): 346
353 (hereinafter cited as "Crossroads").
McCloskey traces
the post-WWII rise of preservation sentiment to today when
preservation "is a remote and unreal issue . . . generally
there is no hostility toward it as a goal, but it is over
whelmed in the competition for attention.
It lacks novelty
and tends to be considered a problem settled long ago.
In
short it has become an old issue to many who believe there
are new dragons to slay."
-

6

-
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Today, the preservation of natural environments
continues to play an increasingly ambiguous and often
controversial role in the larger environmental movement.
For some environmentalists Thoreau's claim that "in wildness
lies the preservation of the world" remains the first
article of environmental faith.

For others preservation is

not merely a peripheral concern.

It is a vulnerable,

because unjustified, part of the broader environmental
movement.*
This chapter's review of the controversy over the role
of preservation will suggest that it stems from the existence
of significant, fundamental philosophical differences within
the environmental movement.

The charges of anti-preser

vation critics and pro-preservation rejoinders suggest that
if everyone is an environmentalist, environmental politics
makes for strange bedfellows.

The various positions

environmentalists hold on the role of preservation are the
most obvious manifestation of those differences.
Examining these positions enables one to make crucial
yet frequently overlooked distinctions between the various
principles and goals by which environmentalists justify
their actions.

It makes clear that how one views the role

of preservationists depends upon whether one justifies
environmentalism by appeals to human survival, to popular
^Daniel E. Kohl, "The Environmental Movement, What Might
It Be," Natural Resources Journal 15, 1339.
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demands, or to environmental values.

Only by critically

examining these various appeals can an adequate evaluation
of preservation be made.
Environmentalists who justify the movement as a lastditch attempt at human survival have been a source of
criticisms of preservationists.

For these environmentalists,

the time spent trying to preserve natural environments
cannot be afforded.

The spirit that motivates preser

vationists may be admirable, admits such an environmentalist,
but it is badly misdirected.

The gravity of the situation

demands that efforts be directed at problems which are of
more immediate concern.

In an address to the 11th Annual

Wilderness Convention, Paul Ehrlich suggested that:
Putting aside a park here and there is laudable, but
not enough. Unless we attack the worldwide problem,
putting aside parks is a waste of time.
There are a
great many reasons to be involved in a worldwide
conservation and population control program.
The main
reason is that we want to live.*
Preservationists would be hard pressed to integrate
their positions with a movement which only justified itself
as an attempt to stave off ecological disaster.

Although

the statements of several preservationists have hinted at
an ecological justification, their claims would be embar
rassingly meek in the face of the impending cataclysms some
*Paul R. Ehrlich, "Population and Conservation: Two
Sides of a Coin," Wilderness: The Edge of Knowledge, ed.
by Maxine E. McCloskey (New York, 1970), 10.
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environmentalists predict.

A. J. Rush's argument for

preservation warns that:
When man obliterates wilderness he repudiates the
evolutionary forces which put him on this planet.
In
a deeply terrifying sense, man will be on his own.^
It has also been suggested that some natural environ
ments should be set aside as ecologically sane neutral
zones, safe from man's ecocidal tendencies.

Such natural

environments would provide a relatively untouched gene pool,
A third frequently espoused claim is that a natural environ
ment provides a laboratory in which scientists can discern
the ideal operation of natural laws.^

Some have asserted

that such natural environments provide models for an
I

ecologically viable society.®
While these claims have a certain validity, they are
not sufficient to justify preserving natural environments
in the face of imminent environmental disaster.

It is

doubtful, for example, that the first argument can be taken
seriously as a suggestion that a new man will evolve again
from a wilderness gene pool a few billion years after we
'Michael McCloskey, p. 352.
'Robert R. Curry, "Discussion," Wilderness : The Edge
of Knowledge, ed. by Maxine McCloskey (New York, 1970),
210-254.
^For a general discussion of the contribution of
wilderness areas to the ecological sciences, see the Sierra
Club's The Meaning of Wilderness to Science, ed. by David
Brower (San Francisco:Sierra Club, 1960).
®Infra, note 9,
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have succumbed to environmental disasters.

That scenario

is not likely to rally frightened thousands to the cause of
preservation,

A response to the second claim might ask if

preservationists are setting aside areas to which the fortu
nate few can emigrate after the ecocatastrophe.

If that is

the case the grasslands of North Dakota seem a more prom
ising sanctuary than the Kapirowits Plateau or the Northern
Rockies.

While proposals for such an ecologically pure

zone are worthy they do not correspond with the actual
efforts of preservationists.

Finally, the claim that

natural areas reveal the ideal operation of ecological laws
is misleading.

Idealizing the operation of those laws in
I

natural areas implies that natural laws are somehow flawed
or being broken in civilized areas.
conceptually inaccurate.

Such a claim is

Ecological laws operate as well in

New York City as they do in the Adirondacks.

They operate

so well that they may prove to be New York City's undoing
by making human life impossible there.

Natural environments

do provide a useful laboratory for those laws, which in turn
define the biological boundaries of human survival.

But

suggestions that man should try to simulate the operation of
those laws in natural environments when reshaping his
culture do not follow.

Cultural norms cannot be extrapolated

from scientific knowledge.

While knowledge of scientific

laws may reveal the range of viable alternatives, it is not
.itself capable of pointing to any particular option as
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intrinsically preferable to the others.

Such preference

remains dependent upon the values of those making the
selection.

Thus, scientific knowledge only provides an

adequate model in those instances where cultural values are
given.*

Since the above claim implies that the virtues

claimed for wild land research result from the absence of
human culture, and since constructing a viable human culture
is the survivalist's chief concern, he should look away from
wholly natural areas for his models.
It is, of course, likely that a certain as yet unde
termined number of natural or unmanipulated environments
must be preserved if the planet's currently teetering
ecological balance is to be restored.

But when applied to

specific areas and made in the face of imminent disasters,
that argument loses most of its force and may often be self
defeating.

Preserving Hells Canyon, for example, can hardly

be justified by a wilderness advocate who makes his appeal
to survival.

Hydroelectric power is much safer than coal

fired or nuclear powered electrical generating plants.
Similarly, the logging of forested natural environments
poses no immediate threat to human survival.

In fact,

Wood is a biodegradable, naturally renewable resource
and requires less energy to process than almost any
major alternative building or craft materials.'*
*Albert Borgman, "The Humanities and the Environment,"
unpublished paper,
'
'“Review of Forests for Whom and for What?, by Marion
Clawson.
Ecology Law Quarterly 5 (1976), 397.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

12

' It should be cautioned that the object of the above
discussion is not to discredit preservationists.

Its goal

has been to show the difficulties of making preservation
more than a peripheral concern for any movement which
justifies its actions by appeals to survival.
Those who justify their environmentalism by appealing
to survival are not the only critics of preservationists.
Many environmentalists who are less desperate in their
appeals also feel uneasy about some of the efforts of
preservationists.

This group will be called "popular

environmentalists," a label which will be fully explained
later in the paper.

For present purposes they can be

defined as those environmentalists whose basic philosophy
is very similar to that of traditional conservationists.
Three of those important similarities are an acceptance of
the general public's cultural values, a reliance on scientific
and technical expertise, and a belief that quickly soliciting
the general public's support for the environmental movement
is a primary c o n c e r n . In summary, a popular environ
mentalist accepts the demands of the public as given, and
^^Conservationists are defined here as advocates of
"wise use" of material resources, not as advocates of
preservation of natural environments.
The term conser
vationist has recently been used interchangeably with
preservationist.
This paper treats conservation as a dis
tinct outgrowth of the progressive conservation movement
of the early 20th Century.
See Samuel P. Hayes, Conservation
and the Gospel of Efficiency (New York: Harvard University
Press), 19 59 and J. Leonard Bates, "Fulfilling American
Democracy: The Conservation Movement, 1907-1921,"
Mississippi Valley Historical Review 44 (1957).
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sees his role as determining the best means of effecting
those demands.

He does not see the environmental movement

as a culturally prescriptive force which advances any
change in popular life-styles beyond those necessary for
a healthy environment.
Although acknowledging and sharing the public’s desire
to preserve a minimally natural environment, popular
environmentalists have suggested that many recent preser
vationists' efforts at stopping proposed developments are
excessive.'*

The development of western coal lands, the

logging of "marginal” wilderness areas, and the construction
of power plants, hydroelectric dams, ski areas, urban
freeways and suburban subdivisions are all obviously necessary
for the pursuit of dominant values.

The increasing numbers

of court cases and administrative review enjoined by
preservationists are slowing these developments, which are
seen by popular environmentalists as an inevitable and
relatively unimportant form of environmental degradation.'*
Much of the popular environmentalist's criticism of
preservationists' efforts and their resulting vulnerability
is based on the observation that a large proportion of the
'*This sentiment is a common one. A scholarly legal
examination of the issue from the perspective of federal
land management agencies has been made by William Siegel,
"Environmental Law--Some Implications for Forest Resource
Management," Environmental Law 4 (1974) 132-134.
1 3

Supra, note 2, p. 353.
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preservationists are members of the upper middle class who
can afford to escape from the city and enjoy natural
environments.^**

The case is frequently made that these

upper middle class preservationists are imposing their
favorite form of nature on lower and lower middle class
recreationists who prefer their nature in more developed
forms.

Due to the preservationists’ superior political

clout, this imposition has had a success which is now alien
ating potential support for other environmental "want
regarding" programs.

The criticisms seem based on a liberal

commitment to equal respect for the aspirations of all
interests as well as a concern for political expediency.
Another telling charge stems from a concern for social
justice.

It questions the morality of locking up timber,

energy, mineral and spatial resources that might alleviate
the suffering of the nation's poor.

Mark Sagoff, for example,

has contended that
If the demands of the poor were measured equally with
the rich, then quicker than you can say cost benefit
analysis you would have parking lots, condominiums
and plastic trees.
The sum of these criticisms demands a response.
Preservationists appear to be a selfish interest group who.
Harry, R. P. Gale and J. Hendee, "Conservation:
An Upper Middle Class Social Movement," Journal of Leisure
Research 1 (Summer 1969), 246-254; W. N. Devall, "Conservation:
An Upper Middle Class Movement: A Duplication," Journal
of Leisure Research 2 (Spring 1970), 123-125.
i^Mark Sagoff, "On Preserving the Natural Environ
ment," Yale Law Journal 84 (1974), 210.
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while claiming to act in the public interest, actually
jeopardize eminently sound environmental programs by not
respecting the desires of others and by exacerbating social
injustice.
While these charges have been partially countered
with studies showing that recreational use of natural
environments is not an upper middle class monopoly,^® and
that the degree to which preservationists have "locked up"
the natural resources of natural environments has been
o v e r b l o w n , charges still carry some force.

It now seems

quite evident, for example, that although the general public
places a high value on a pastoral northern great plains it
places greater value on an ample supply of electricity.

The

continuing and probably increasing vulnerability of natural
environments which contain any material resources is
suggested by a 1970 study which shows an overwhelming
majority of the nation's population to be unwilling to forgo
its consumptive habits for the sake of the environment.^®
There is little reason to believe the public's priorities
have changed over the past several years, or that the
**G. H. Stankey, "Myths in Wilderness Decision
Making," Journal of Soil and Water Conservation 26, 186.
^’David Sumner, "Where Forests Stand," Sierra Club
Bulletin, May 1976, 45, a review of The Forest Killers:
The Destruction of American Wilderness by Jack Shephard.
i*James McEvoy III, "The American Concern With the
Environment" in Social Behavior, Natural Resources and the
Environment edited by William R. Burch, Neil H. Cheek, Jr.,
and Lee Taylor (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 229.
(Hereinafter cited as Resources.)
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public’s material demands on natural environments have or
will decrease.

In view of the continuing consumptive

imperative, preservationists will probably play an increas
ingly controversial role in and out of the environmental
movement.

The goals of preservationists and the general

public will frequently be at odds.
Unfortunately the usual defense of preservationists,
while not devoid of merit, generally avoids directly
confronting popular environmentalists' criticisms.

In the

tradition of John Muir, preservationists shrug off charges
that they are a selfish elite and claim that a natural
environment has an intrinsic value that stands apart from
human values and desires.

The advocates of these environ

ments frequently announce themselves to be the interpreters
of those v a l u e s . A s

a result, the criticism and the

defense view the same position from totally different
perspectives, one seeing it as an ultimately selfish
position, the other as an idealistic, even mystical,
position which only incidentally serves the interests of the
actor.
:*See e.g. Sierra Club v. Morton 405 U.S. 727, 741-2,
744-45 (1972) (Justice Douglas dissenting).
"Contemporary
public concern for protecting nature's ecological equili
brium should lead to the conferral of standing upon environ
mental objects to sue for their own preservation . . . .
Those who hike [Mineral King Valley] fish it, hunt it,
camp in it, frequent it or visit it are legitimate
spokesmen for the inanimate object."
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The recent popularity of the "biocentric perspective”
and of seeing oneself as "a member of the biological team”
are justifications out of the same mystical mold.^“
Although the claim of having expanded one's personal
concerns and feelings to include a consideration of the
feelings and desires of other fauna and flora does reflect
a well ,developed environmental ethic, it has yet to be
determined whether convincing arguments can be developed
about exactly how nature "wants" to be treated in those
specific cases where man's desires and nature's "desires”
conflict.2 1

Until those arguments are developed, or the

nation shares a collective empathy for nature's "feelings"
such an appeal is certainly problematic.

Just as the

suggestion that science produces cultural norms which tell
2“This notion seems to be an outgrowth of Aldo
Leopold's plea for an environmental ethic in A Sand County
Almanac (New York: Oxford University Press, 1949).
2iSagoff, supra note 15, discusses the flaw in
claiming to speak for nature. As he suggests, the spokes
man is left with a free rein to interpret nature's values
£fs he wills.
". . . Why wouldn't Mineral King want to host
a ski resort, after doing nothing for a billion years?
In
another few millenia it will be back to original condition
just the same.
The Sequoia National Forest tells the
developer that it wants a ski lift by a certain declivity
in its hills and snowiness during the winter . . . and that
it needs a four lane highway by the appearance of certain
valley passages and obvious scenic turnouts on the mountain
side. The seashore, meanwhile, indicates its willingness
to entertain poor people from Oakland by becoming covered
with great quantities of sand.
Finally, it is reasonable
to think that Old Man River might do something for a changé,
like make electricity and not just keep rolling along."
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us how we should live with nature is suspect, the proposed
injunctions of self-appointed interpreters who claim to tell
us what nature wants also strains credibility.

They inject

arbitrary dogma about nature into a controversy which is
difficult enough to resolve when only avowedly human
aspirations are considered.
Commitments to and defense of the values of natural
environments need not be so arbitrary.

They can be rooted

in avowedly human desires and be made capable of a reasoned
elaboration and discussion.
made later in the paper.

An attempt at doing so will be

For now it is only necessary to

suggest that the failure of the traditional preservationist
response to directly confront the charges of their "want
regarding" critics or explain their role in relation to the
larger environmental movement stems from the fact that this
and several other important dimensions of the issue have
been overlooked.
*

A

*

*

*

The above discussion suggests that a defense of
preservation which does not question the philosophical
assumptions of preservation critics is not fully convincing.
Fortunately, the positions given a rather cursory treatment
here do not exhaust those which can be held.

This paper

will support yet another perspective on preservation, that
of reform environmentalism.

Reform environmentalism

comprises a culturally distinct, culturally prescriptive
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movement whose ultimate objective is to change reigning
cultural values.

It attacks the excessively consumptive

vision of the good life as responsible for a deteriorating
quality of life and a sense of alienation from nature.

Its

philosophical base is a blend of a sentimentalized agrarian
past,^^ a neo Marxist critique of modern industrial society,
and elements of progressive liberalism. ^ A l t h o u g h no
comprehensive concept of the public interest has yet
emerged from the movement, two clearly dominant themes are
a rejection of many modern technologies and a loss of faith
in market economies.

Modern technology and market economies,

claim reform environmentalists, have thwarted cultural ideals
which the reform community sees as serving their as yet
unclear concept of the public interest.

These ideals can

be broadly generalized as a discriminantly consumptive
life-style and a more natural environment.
This paper will show how reform environmentalism
readily accommodates and defends what was earlier criticized
as the misdirected and excessive efforts of preservationists.
By clarifying the reform perspective, this paper will show
^^Theodore Roszak, Where the Wasteland Ends (Garden
City, New York: Anchor Books, 1973).
*^Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1964), also, Murray Bookchin, Post Scarcity Anarchism
(San Francisco: Ramparts Press, 1971).
F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful: Economics As
If People Mattered (New Yorkl Harper and Row, 1973).
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how the principles of survivalist and popular environ
mentalism are themselves inadequate to achieve the desired
goals of a movement for environmental reform.

As a result

criticisms which are based on those principles lose much of
their force.

The weakness of those critiques will then be

further demonstrated by developing a reform preservationist
position and by responding to anti-preservation charges in
a manner consistent with reform goals.
Finally this paper will briefly review past reform
movements whose ultimate goals were cultural change and show
why efforts at preserving natural environments are not
vulnerable efforts but make a unique contribution to the
viability of a culturally prescriptive environmentalism.
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CHAPTER III
PRESERVATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
The first task is to penetrate environmental thought
and distinguish the philosophical underpinnings of reform
environmentalism from the underpinnings of survivalist and
popular environmentalism.

As suggested earlier the

environmental movement is not bound by a coherent philosophy.
After an initial agreement that the mutual concern is over
man's troubled relationship with nature the movement breaks
down into a colloidal suspension of justifying principles.^
Before making a successful empirical analysis of the
environmental movement, it is necessary to construct a
conceptual framework that can be used to elucidate differ
ences that are apparently overlooked by most environmental
ists and lie at the heart of the controversy over
preserving natural environments.

To construct this frame

work it is necessary to step back from the environmental
movement to a more philosophical level of discussion.
The underlying question in the controversy over
preservation is "how does one justify one's position on
environmental issues?"
survival.

Some environmentalists appeal to

The serious failings of such an appeal will be

‘Denton E. Morrison, K. E. Hornbeck and W. Keith
Warner, "The Environmental Movement: Some Preliminary
Observations and Predictions," Resources, p. 301.

-
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discussed later.

There are only two justifying principles

which need be taken seriously here.

The use of one of

those principles was implicit in the charges of those
popular environmentalists who criticized preservationists
for impeding developments such as the strip mining of the
northern plains, a development which is apparently necessary
for the continuing pursuit of the popular conception of the
good life.

The principle implicit in the charge is that

one must give the public what it wants.

Conversely, the

brief sketch of the culturally paternalistic reform
environmentalists suggested that their appeal was to principles
about what the public should want, not to the public’s
existing wants.
The important difference between the two appeals is
immediately obvious.

Brian Barry has divided the spectrum

of justificatory principles into two categories:
regarding" and "ideal regarding."

"want

These principles are

relevant to an analysis of the environmental movement.
Want regarding principles . . . are principles which
take as given the wants which people happen to have
and concentrate attention entirely on the extent to
which a certain action will alter the overall amount
of want satisfaction . . .^
Under such a principle, a public position (and the
action it implies) makes its appeal and is judged only
according to its ability to bring about the state of
affairs wanted by the general public.
*Brian M. Barry, Political Argument (New York: The
Humanities Press, 1965), p. 38.
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The assumption undergirding want regarding principles
is that one individual's wants are as good as the next's.
"It is not possible to make moral judgments about the
intrinsic value of those wants or preferences or to rank
them in any way." ^

The desires of each individual who wants

increased consumption of electrical energy counts for the
same as those of each individual who wants a pastoral
northern great plains, and each have equal claim to
satisfaction.
The intellectual tradition of want regarding principles
runs back to the classic liberal theories of John Locke,
through Benthamite utilitarianism, and on to today's
welfare economics.

Want regarding principles have also been

institutionalized in our democratic political structure and
market economy.**
Examples of the want regarding principle are readily
drawn.

When one justifies one's position by reference to a

law requiring that an area be managed according to the
Multiple Use Act, one is appealing to the mandate of majority
wants, as expressed through a legislative body.

When an

administrator refers to a cost-benefit analysis which claims
that the value of increased electrical power legitimates the
construction of western power plants, he accepts the value
^Marc F. Plattner, "The New Political Theory," The
Public Interest 50 (Summer 1975) 127.
‘‘Barry, pp. 39, 41.
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which the public's demands, as expressed through the
marketplace, places on increased electric power.

The

assumption of the popular (i.e., those who appeal to a want
regarding principle) environmentalist critics of preser
vation is that the legitimacy or value of an action or a
thing is only a function of the aggregate public desire for
it.*
An ideal regarding principle is defined by Barry as
any principle which deviates from a purely want regarding
position.*

Such a principle may demand that particular

desires be ignored, actively discouraged, or promoted, i.e.,
pastoral environments should be preserved, the desires of
the public not withstanding.

A public action is justified

by its contribution to the realization of the favored social
values or goals.

One underlying assumption of an ideal

regarding principle is that some wants and opinions, since
motivated by superior values, are worth more than desires
motivated by lesser values, and are consequently more
deserving of satisfaction, i.e., the value or desirability
of something is defined independently of the aggregate desire
for that thing.

A second underlying assumption is that, on

occasion, some people might not know what is best for
themselves.

External guidance is required for some men

to lead the "best kind of life."
*Ibid., pp. 39-41
*Ibid.
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Depending on its nature and complexity, an ideal
regarding principle can justify any kind of action.

It

might make an appeal to the cultural despot of Plato's
Republic, or simply to a constitutional right.

A consti

tutional right, for example by serving as a check on the
wants of the public as expressed through the legislative
and executive branches, rests on the belief that certain
things are too important to be left to the vagaries of the
majority will.^
The above examples have largely been drawn from insti
tutionalized instances of want and ideal regarding
principles.

This paper will be more concerned with the role

those principles play in the period of controversy pre
ceding the passage of legislation, an appeal to the courts
or an administrative decision.

The discussions in these

predecision periods are filled with references to "the
public interest."

The distinction between want regarding

and ideal regarding principles explains at least some of the
confusion which results when two different positions appeal
to the "public interest."

Does the public interest mean

that state of affairs which maximizes satisfaction of popular
wants, subject to distributive modifications?

Is it the

state of affairs desired by a majority frustrated by log
rolling politics, indifferent bureaucrats, big business, an
’'"Note: Towards A Constitutionally Protected Environ
ment," Virginia Law Review 56, 458 (1970) 481.
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unsound technology, or corrupted administrators?

If either

of the above examples, it is based on the want regarding
principle.

But if the public interest is conceived as a

superior state of affairs which might be overlooked or
undervalued by an unenlightened public, which is the
conception those interested in reforming values employ, the
public interest has a meaning quite distinct from the former
cases.*
There are, then, as indicated by the controversy over
preservation, three general concepts of the public interest
appealed to by environmentaists.

First a survivalist concept

claims that it is in the public interest (in both a want
regarding and ideal regarding.sense) to take immediate,
perhaps drastic, steps to ensure the public's survival.

A

want regarding appeal demands that the public be given the
kind of environment it wants.

An ideal regarding concept of

the public interest appeals to the vision of the particular
kind of society which best serves human needs.
Although these distinctions are hot complex they seem
to be "glossed over" by the environmental movement.

It

would be difficult to assign particular environmentalists
to the categories of survivalist, popular or reform environ
mentalists on the basis of their public statements.

It is

®C. W. Cassinelli, "The Public Interest in Political
Ethics," Nomos V, The Public Interest, ed. Carl. J. Friedrich
(New York: Atherton Press, 1962) 44-53; also Cassinelli,
"Some Reflections on the Concept of the Public Interest,"
Ethics 59 (1958) 48-61.
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likely that at various times all three types of appeals
have been implicit in the statements of most.

In spite of

this gloss, the controversy over preservation suggests that
the movement is capable of crystalizing into the categories
described here.
The failure of the movement to be more self conscious
about its philosophical differences is surprising, parti
cularly from the perspective of reform environmentalism.

The

differences, as followed to their logical conclusions, have
very different potential outcomes.

It can be shown, for

example, that appeals to survival and to want regarding
conceptions of the public interest are not likely to achieve
the goals of reform environmentalism.
*

*

*

*

*

To attack the position of the survivalists might seem
rather arrogant.

Without a doubt their position is in a

sense the least controversial one an environmentalist might
adopt.

The choice between living and dying is not contro

versial.

But paradoxically, to justify one's environ

mentalism on appeals to a survivalist conception of the
public interest may also serve to minimize the ultimate
impact of that environmentalism.
If the initial choice left to the nation is simply
between living and dying, many options may arise once the
decision is made for survival.

An appeal to survival cannot

then claim a preference for any option which can be shown to
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lie within the parameters of survival.

If the ecological

sciences should reveal that biologically viable societies
run the gamut from a spotless, stainless steel, smoothly
functioning spaceship earth,* to a return to the agrarian
past, the survivalist has eliminated his voice from some
very important decisions.

A more precise appeal is required

before a more specific solution can be justified.^®
In direct contrast, the reform environmentalist is
very concerned with the various kinds of solutions which
might be developed in response to the threats to human
survival.

He advances his preferences on the basis of his

more specific description of the public interest.

By

criticizing consumptive habits, not simply because they
threaten survival, but because they are contrary to what he
claims to be a way of life which would better serve human
needs, he preserves a voice in the discussion of possible
alternatives.
The survivalist, however, remains silent in the face
of misconceived ideals about the good life, ideals which the
reform environmentalist sees as the central issue.

It is an

*Richard Buckminster Fuller, Operating Manual for
Spaceship Earth (New York: Parker Books) .
^“Many environmentalists assume that physical
realities will eventually dictate the environmental path
chosen.
See Robert Heilbronner, "Ecological Armageddon,"
New York Review of Books 14 (April 23, 1970) 9, review of
Paul and Anne Ehrlich's Population Resources and the
Environment. This paper is taking a dif ferent tack ; this
tack is discussed in more detail later in the paper
Chapter IV).
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indication of the survivalist’s prescriptive impotence that
his calls for change are couched in terms of retrenchment.
Unlike the reform environmentalist, who offers the possi
bility of a better life, the survivalist reluctantly
suggests that we may have to give up our consumptive habits
if we are to survive.

This suggests that those who make

such an appeal might share the reigning vision of the good
life.
The controversy over the future of nuclear power
illustrates the limitations of a survivalist appeal.
Reform environmentalists can question such plants because
they would be built to serve consumptive habits which are
not in the best interests of those consumers.

Claims that

the plants will not endanger human life do not eliminate
the reform critique.

The survivalist's position would lose

its force, however, because it did not confront the con
sumptive imperative to build the plants.

The survivalist's

appeal is sufficient only if one's concern extends no
further than preventing the loss of human life.

It seems

obvious that if one's environmentalism includes any concerns
which do not have clear implications for survival, it is
advisable to develop a more elaborate concept of the public
interest.
^^Although one of the general conclusions of Dennis L.
Meadows et. al.. The Limits to Growth (New York: Universe
Books, 1972) is that growth values will have to change, no
moral judgment about those values is made.
The general
tone of the book, however, hardly treats such a prospect
as a unique and rewarding opportunity.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

30

An environmentalism which appeals to a want regarding
conception of the public interest on the other hand also
fails to address consumptive life-styles.

Such environ

mentalism sees its role as effecting the ideals of the
public as given, not as the promotion of new ones.

As

in the case of survivalism, the epistemological problems
encountered by popular environmentalism cover a relatively
narrow r a n g e . P o p u l a r environmentalism relies largely on
scientific, economic and political information.

But such

objective information does not in itself confront or discredit
any life-style that is consistent with a biologically
viable society.
An appeal to a purely want regarding conception of the
public interest assumes environmental problems can be
resolved through current economic and political institutions
once the public is more fully scientifically, economically
and politically informed about the threats posed by pollution,
unplanned development, clear cutting forests and intensive
use of chemicals in agriculture.

After the voting and

consuming public is well informed, more rational decisions
will be made.

Such a diagnosis makes the duty of popular

environmentalism clear.
12

It is to do research, inform, and

See Chapter II, page 5.

^^Albert Borgmann's "Humanities and the Environmental
Movement" [unpublished paper) discusses limits of natural
and social sciences vis a vis environmental values.
Also
see E. F. Schumacher's Small is Beautiful New York: Harper
and Row, 1973) 80-99.
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explain the options available for resolving environmental
issues.
It is impossible to overestimate the importance of
adequate information for the entire environmental movement.
But as necessary as it is, it is not sufficient for an
environmental reform movement.

Daniel Kohl, a member of the

scientific information movement, recently described its
dissemination of scientific information as a "profoundly
political act,"^“ which alerted the public to the often
self-serving intentions of corporate America.
limits, his analysis holds true.

Within

There is no doubt that

there exist many significant gaps between the aspirations
of corporate America and the general public.

But resolving

the issues raised by those gaps may not meet the require
ments of reform environmentalism.

Although corporate and

consuming America may feel differently about the best
location of power plants and oil refineries, restrictions on
subdivisions, or types and costs of pollution control,
rarely do the dialogues in these controversies culminate in
a confrontation over the public’s highly consumptive habits.
That plants or refineries Will be built somewhere is rarely
questioned.

Instead the controversies follow the patterns

of interest-group politics.

For example, the residents of

a region protest that their interest is diminished if a
'^Daniel E. Kohl, "The Environmental Movement, What
Might It Be," Natural Resources Journal 15, pp. 3-13.
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power plant is built in their area.

Opposing them, the

power company claims its interests are best served by
building in that region, as opposed to a less profitable
spot.

The controversy can be characterized as one concerning

which interest group will be served in the course of pursuing
an assumed conception of the public interest, increased
abundance.

Such interest group politics may raise important

public moral questions about how the cost of industrial
growth and pollution control should be distributed, but the
more substantive questions about more ultimate social goals
are often easily avoided.

On the continuing and expanding

availability of material goods of doubtful real value, the
interests of corporate and consuming America appear closely
allied.
Although popular environmentalism may recognize the
obsessive character of America's consumptive habits, its
commitment to respecting the aspirations of the public
regardless of their content limits it to the traditional
anti-big business rhetoric.

The reluctance to address the

public's desires to expand consumption is revealed in
criticisms of America's technology and market economy.
These criticisms do not contend that our industrial technology
is misguided or overdeveloped by consumptive values.

In

this view, technology is simply "stupid" due to a lack of
technical expertise, corporate irresponsibility, a failure
to engage in long-range planning, and the absence of ecolo-
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gical information.^®

The chief complaint of a want regarding

perspective about our market economy is not how it aggra
vates an excessively consumptive vision of the good life,
but sees the market's major defect as its inability to
take "externalities" such as pollution into account.
Proper government regulation and incentives cân internalize
those costs of pollution, spur a "smarter" technology, and
enable a continued increase in consumption.^®
The concept of a "popular" or purely want regarding
environmentalism requires qualification.

As suggested

earlier, an empirical review of the environmental movement
shows that it is not easily broken down into distinctly
popular and prescriptive elements.

The use of those

categories by this paper has been justified by the interaction
of those categories in the controversy over preservation,
not by any conscious alignment on other issues.

Environmental

positions on other issues however, such as those described
above, can also be described as want regarding.

The

solutions posed in these issues do not call dominant values
into question, but simply seek to resolve commonly held
i®John Kenneth Gailbraith, Economics and the Public
Purpose (Boston; Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973).
Gailbraith is strangely ambivalent in his attitudes toward
consumption in his latest book. Although attacking
needless consumption in much of the book, he retreats from
this otherwise firm stand when discussing the environment,
p. 267.
i®Sanford Race, "The Economics of Environmental
Quality," Fortune 81 (1970), 120-21.
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environmental concerns.

As a result it seems legitimate to

distinguish want regarding environmentalism from reform
environmentalism.
Although this paper is not attempting to develop an
environmental sociology, a few suggestions about the kinds
of roles and situations which are likely to produce
"popular", or want regarding positions might prove helpful.
Obviously, want regarding positions are held by those
opposed to any fundamental changes in popular values, but
are nonetheless displeased with the current state of
environmental affairs.

This might include a city resident

whose interest in the environmental movement reflects a
concern about the smog he is forced to breathe every day,
but whose interest diminishes when broader concerns are
discussed.

Similarly, the preservationist whose sole

environmental concern is an uncrowded recreation area is
not about to suggest any changes which alter his own
life-style.^ ^
*^It should be cautioned that the distinction being
discussed is not that between acting in the public interest
and out of self interest.
The distinction is between
promoting value change or not promoting value change.
Which of those serves the public interest depends entirely
upon one's conception of it. A purely want regarding
conception, for example, would claim the two hypothetical
individuals above to be acting in the public interest by
acting "selfishly." The distinction between acting
selfishly and out of obligation to an idealized concept
of the public interest is not discussed until Chapter
Four.
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Popular or want regarding positions also dominate the
political side of environmentalism.

Any environmental

program or politician hoping for short-term success will
emphasize their compatibility with dominant values, and the
minimal impact either would make on consumptive aspirations.
Finally, environmentalists who are committed to
cultural change find most popular solutions compatible with
their ultimate goals.

This tendency of popular and reform

positions to overlap is one reason that distinguishing
between the two is so difficult.^*

The difference between

popular and prescriptive environmentalism remains a real one,
however, despite the difficulty in assigning it to
particulars.

For example, although the reform environ

mentalist agrees that objective information is necessary
for voters and consumers to realize their goals more
rationally, his chief concern is not only the rationality of
the public, but also the substance of the ideals that
rationality serves.

If those ideals are the expansion of

consumptive opportunities, merely providing information
will not achieve the desired goal.

Barring a sudden change

in public tastes, the most that a purely popular environ
mentalism will achieve is a tidy, temporarily healthy
society characterized by a congested, overdeveloped land
scape, and a spiralling rate of consumption.

This scenario

^®A more detailed discussion of the overlapping
concerns of popular and reform environmentalism is found
in Chapter V, pages 73-74
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does not match the reform environmentalist’s conception of
the public interest.
A reform oriented preservationist who accepts criti
cisms based on a want regarding conception of the public
interest has failed to consider the limits of such an
appeal.

Attempts at rebutting its criticisms without

attacking want regarding assumptions overlook the possi
bilities and requirements of appealing his actions to an
ideal regarding concept of the public interest.

Such a

conception and the requirements of appealing to it will be
the subject of the following chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
A REFORM POSITION ON PRESERVATION
An appeal to a want regarding conception of the
public interest makes very different epistemological demands
than does an appeal to an ideal regarding conception.

An

action under a want regarding conception is predicated on
a hypothetical imperative.

If the public wants clean

streams, then pollution control devices must be developed.
Justifying one's actions by appealing to public values as
given only requires empirical investigations.
exactly, does the public want?
need to serve those wants?

What,

What information does it

Such problems call for opinion

polls, improved public input in management decisions,
holding elections, improving the techniques of technology
assessment and cost benefit analysis.

Once wants have been

accurately determined and informed the problems encountered
are, in the broadest sense, technical ones . . . what
policies, procedures, technologies, and institutions are
the best means to the end of satisfying public demands?
Grounding one's environmental positions in a want
regarding conception of the public interest is as much of
a morally controversial commitment, however, as a position
grounded in an ideal regarding conception.

Although an

ideal regarding concept requires developing a paternalistic

37-
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position, both concepts are equally evaluative-

A

principle which demands that one's actions effect the demands
of the public . . .
is precisely comparable, in its status as a value
judgment, to identifying the public interest with the
terrestrial realization of God's will; neither can be
proved to a skeptic.^
Appealing to an ideal regarding conception of the
public interest does require investigations of a different
sort.

Such an appeal is predicated on an overtly moral

injunction.

Streams should be clean, the apathy or in

difference of the public notwithstanding.

Like the want

regarding appeal such an appeal requires a determination of
the best means to the desired end.

But determining and

justifying that end requires a value judgment about the
desires for polluting products and the desires for a more
natural environment.

Any defense of such a judgment cannot

rest solely on technical or scientific knowledge, but must
ultimately rest on a morally controversial position
claiming that a particular way of life is superior to
others.

It is the morality of such a claim which elevates

it from the undifferentiated collection of public demand to
that of a legitimate appeal to an ideal regarding concept of
the public interest.
^C. W. Cassinelli, "The Public Interest in Political
Ethics," Nomos V, The Public Interest, edited by Carl J.
Friedrich (New York: Atherton Press, 1962), 48.
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The concept of a moral position is crucial to reform
oriented preservation and requires some explanation here.
It is not sufficient for the reform preservationists
to reject the public's consumptive desires out of hand.
Appealing to reform environmentalism's ideal regarding
concept of the public interest requires the development of
a moral position which justifies the conviction that the
general public has overestimated the value of abundant
electricity and that the demand for it should be discounted.
It also requires a detailed description of a reform concept
of the public interest, and an explanation of how increased
consumption at the expense of preserving natural environments
conflicts with that conception.
A moral position is not capable of the precision and
confirmability of an empirically based position.

One might

even wholly disagree with another's position on an issue,
and still acknowledge that the position he holds is a moral
one.

This does not mean that one desire is as good as the

next, or that one desire's claim to recognition as a moral
position is as good as the next.

There are certain general

requirements which a desire or position must meet before it
can be identified as a moral position.

These general

requirements . . .
enforce the difference between positions (desires)
which we must respect, although we think them
wrong, and positions (desires) we need not respect
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because they offend some ground rule of moral
reasoning.^
As suggested above, one of those ground rules is that
a position which claims the superiority of natural environ
ments to increased electrical power must give reasons backing
such a claim.

There is a distinct difference between a

self evident value claim such as "good health is better
than sickness" and an arbitrary claim with which one might
legitimately take issue, i.e., "reading books is better
than watching television."

A controversial claim must

explain itself through a "reasoned elaboration."
phrase Bentham, why is poetry better than pushpin?

To para
One

possible reason that poetry might be superior is that it
provides a challenging activity which promotes a reflective
incisive mind.

Additionally poetry may prove to be a

vehicle by which a great creative genius will be developed,
a genius who will make all of our lives richer.^
Valid reasons assume certain theories about what is
good ("superior," "richer") for the individual.**

All

reasons must at least be capable of such a reference.

It

is not possible to explain why one's desires are better and
serve the public interest without also defining what one
^Ronald Dworkin, "Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of
Morals," Morality and the Law, ed. Richard A. Wasserstrom
(Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1971) 62,
^Ibid., p. 62.
'Ibid., p. 63.
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means by "better."

For example, while the reasons just

elaborated (poetry is superior to pushpin) square rather
nicely with a value theory which sees man's goal as the
production of a few brilliant supermen, they do not square
so nicely with the Christian ideal of humility.
Nor is it sufficient to simply elaborate one's desires
in a directionless manner.

The reasons given must mitigate

the arbitrary nature of the initial claim that pushpin is
inferior to poetry.

One cannot refer to irrelevant con

siderations, such as the geographic or economic backgrounds
of those who prefer pushpin.

The concern is with the value

of pushpin, not with factors which do not touch upon the
merits of the activity itself.

Similarly it is not suffi

cient as a "reason" to simply claim that "pushpin is
disgusting."

The object of a reasoned elaboration is to

explain one's emotions not to make reference to those emotions.
To do so is simply to make another arbitrary statement.®
A second requirement of a moral position is consistency.®
One's lifestyle and opinions on other matters must reflect
the avowed sincerety of the belief that preserving natural
environments is indeed superior to developing them and would
serve the public interest.

Does one's own lifestyle require

unnecessarily large doses of electric power?

Does one try

®Ibid.
®Ibid., p. 66
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to promote and make available the enjoyment of natural
environments to the general public or does one attempt to
horde them?
Consistency also requires that one's stands on other
issues make an appeal to the same conception of the public
interest.

The preservationist who claims that the world

is threatened by an eco-catastrophe from nuclear wastes,
yet unaccountably opposes hydro-electric power projects on
other grounds is guilty of a lack of consistency, either due
to moral dishonesty or intellectual oversight.

In either

case, such inconsistent stands suggest to the observer that
the appeal to the public interest is a matter of convenience,
not conviction.
The following discussion is not an attempt at an
exhaustive construction of a moral position on preser
vation.

It does hope to guide reform oriented humanists and

technicians in the construction of such a position.

This

will be done by pointing to the kinds of philosophical and
technical demands which must be met before a moral position
on preservation is achieved.
The following discussion will also suggest that a
reform position makes an appeal to a particular concept of
the public interest, one which is uniquely effective as a
response to popular criticisms.

The suggested concept is

rooted in the same tradition of liberal political and moral
philosophy which conceived democratic and free market
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institutions.

Appealing one's position on preservation and

other environmental issues to the traditional liberal
conception of the public interest suggests the desire of
reform environmentalists,to respect many of the values of
want regarding institutions, and the individual autonomy
which those institutions promote.

It implies that the basic

objection is not to the principle of individual autonomy but
stems from a concern about how that principle requires an
adjustment to meet new conditions.
One characteristic of the liberal tradition is its
ambivalence about the political community's ultimate moral
commitment.

One strand of liberal philosophy, from Locke

through Bentham to today's welfare economics, has viewed the
role of the state from a purely want regarding perspective.
This strand of the tradition does not deny the legitimacy
of the positive state, i.e., an active role in economic
affairs.

It simply disclaims the state's role as the

promotion of a particular kind of individual or culture.
Another strand, which placed greater emphasis upon the
substantive ideals of a liberal society, first appeared in
the early 19th Century in the writings of Von Humbolt and
were developed by such writers as Mill and Hobbhouse.

Their

attention to substantive ideals was a response to the immi
nent expansion of suffrage rights to those outside the
middle class.

These theorists developed generalized, yet

substantive ideals about the kind of life-styles and the kind
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of society that democratic and free market institutions would
promote.

Their claim was that these ideals were the

inevitable outgrowth of such institutions.

Such a sub

stantive concept of the public interest was necessary to
justify the existence of those institutions to the large
numbers of economically unfortunate for whom the benefits
of "freedom" were as yet unclear.’
One assumed outcome of want regarding economic and
political institutions was that by placing upon individuals
the onus of making their own decisions in the political and
economic marketplaces, want regarding institutions would
force men to develop their own underlying ideals.

Such men

would become selfconscious enough of their goals to make a
reasonable elaboration of their economic and political
desires.

These desires would not be arbitrary, pointless,

or thoughtless.

They would be the desires of morally

coherent, consistent individuals, desires which observed the
ground rules of a moral position.
The second assumption was that want regarding insti
tutions, by satisfying the desires of men "following their
own lights," would produce a society characterized by
diverse life-styles and communities, challenging experiences,
and inhabited by men who held the unique aspirations of
their morally coherent peers in respect.
’C. B. MacPherson, Democratic Theory: Essays in
Retrieval (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973) 4-6.
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In summary, the concept of the public interest used
to justify want regarding institutions was composed of
two basic ideals.

One claimed that a good society was one

which promoted the development of men who lead morally
coherent lives.

The other was that a good society was

composed of diverse groups and individuals which in turn
enabled a wide variety of individual experiences.
By justifying want regarding institutions with an
appeal to substantive ideals, the ideal regarding liberal
philosophers placed the validity of want regarding insti
tutions in a special light.

The implication was that the

political community could legitimately assume a culturally
paternal role in instances where the justifying ideals of
want regarding institutions could not be achieved through
these institutions.

The prospect of a culturally paternal

role for the state was not thoroughly explored by these
philosophers, however, due to a third assumption which had
allowed the original assumption of the congruence between
want regarding institutions and ultimate goals to be made.
This third assumption was of the existence of an inevitably
reciprocal relationship between the two substantive ideals
which composed the public interest.

Men who experienced a

culture of diverse opinions and life-styles and encountered
a wide variety of experiences would be more likely to fall
back on and become aware of the ideals underlying their own
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aspirations.

This in turn would engender an ongoing larger

society of unique individuals and communities.
In the largely romantic pre-technological context of
the early 19th Century, when hopes for the nobility and
autonomy of each individual were high, these assumptions were
not naive.

It now seems open to question, however, whether

the indiscriminate satisfaction of desires in the economic
marketplace is promoting the kind of morally coherent
life-styles or diverse society, i.e., the public interest,
for which that freedom was intended.
The divergence between the traditional liberal concept
of the public interest and the actual outcome of unchecked
consumption also serves as a potential springboard from which
the preservationist convictions about the relative values of
the competing demands upon natural environments can be
reasonably elaborated.
tracable.

The divergence is historically

Its roots lie in the 17th Century English middle

class, whose philosophers, particularly John Locke, ex
pressed the emerging concept of man and the good life, a
concept which was substantially different from traditional
beliefs.

C. B. MacPherson paraphrases the Lockean description

of man as:
Essentially an unlimited desirer of utilities,
a creature whose nature is to seek satisfaction of
unlimited desires, both innate and acquired. The
desires could be seen as sensual or rational or
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both.
What mattered was that their satisfaction required
a continuous input of things from the outside . . .®
Under such a view, m a n ’s ideals or ends were to relieve
any scarcity in that input.

The essence of rational behavior

was held to lie in an opportunity for extensive use of
natural resources.
Previous concepts of man had stressed a moderate
appetite for material goods, calculated to serve ideals about
what a good life entailed.

For the energetic English middle

class, however, busy constructing a new productive system,
unlimited desire was seen as good in itself, and a necessary
impetus to ending the evils of scarcity.
The upshot of this new concept of man was a new ideal
of the good life.

Jeremy Benthara provided a succinct

description of the new view.
Each portion of wealth has a corresponding portion of
happiness.
Of two individuals with unequal fortune
he who has the most wealth has the most happiness.®
It is unlikely that the ethos for which Locke and
Bentham spoke either anticipated or was intended to serve
as a mandate for the wastefulness and conspicuous consumption
of modern industrial society.

The political and technological

context in which those ideals came to be effective, however,
combined with them to contribute to the realization of
these modern realities.
®MacPherson, Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval, p. 30
®Ibid., p. 27.
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This consumptive ideal became intimately bound up with
the growth of liberal individualism and the want regarding
state.

In the want regarding state, specific ideals about

the kind of life an individual should lead were no longer
politically promoted.

The role of the state was to

satisfy, either politically or through the market economy,
the desires of the public as given.

Unlike older, pre-

Reformation political communities, which had articulated the
ideals consumption should serve, thus making consumption
subject to moral review, the new view claimed that the
formulation of those ideals was a private, individual
matter, outside the sphere of political action.

The kinds

of consumption were no longer seen as actions to be
politically guided or promoted.

It became assumed that

individual consumptive desires should be satisfied, regardless
of their conformity to any ideals about what a good life
entailed.

The new emphasis on consumption and the demise of

politically recognized ideals to which an individual's
consumption need appeal combined to make satisfying con
sumptive desires themselves the ultimate, unreproachable end
of political affairs.

Treating men as infinite consumers

initially served the public interest very well.

It inspired

and was inspired by a market system and industrial technology
which seemed destined to satisfy many legitimate wants and
contributed to a diverse, dynamic society which reflected
the ideals of the ideal regarding liberal philosophers.
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Critics of American values from DeTocqueville through
today have focused on the transmission of this want regarding
ethos to America, and the pervasive success it has enjoyed
here.

This is not a claim that all Americans express

unqualified agreement with Bentham's dictum.

It does seem

likely, however, that most reservations would be based
upon its oversimplification of the good life, not on its
lack of essential truth.

As a result of the success of the

want regarding ethos increasing abundance has become
synonymous with the public interest.

How many public figures

have argued that it is in the public interest to do with
less or the same, when more is possible?

We are, as David

Potter has suggested, a "people of plenty" for whom
increasing abundance serves as the unifying social goal.

It

has till now been the least controversial, the most frequently
appealed to, and invariably the overriding principle of
public life.I°
Today, however, the flaw in automatically associating
increased consumption with the public interest has become
objectified as a monolithic culture of consumers, whose
indiscriminantly consumptive habits are engendering a sense
of alienation from nature as well as an increasingly
environmentally precarious technology.
^“David M. Potter, People of Plenty: Economic Abundance
and the American Character (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1954).
Potter's thesis is that abundance is the dis
tinguishing and unifying attribute of the American character.
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In the instance of unrestrained consumption, want
regarding principles have failed to live up to the
standards of the ideal regarding philosophers.

The assumption

of a reciprocally perpetuating relationship between morally
autonomous men and a diverse social environment did not
anticipate the impact of powerful value-shaping forces on
the social environment.

By the default of a political

tradition which has claimed neutrality on the question of
what kind of life is the best life, those supposedly
individually determined ends have been shaped by an
expanding technology which readily serves a narrow range of
material demands, while neglecting other needs that are
equally pressing.

The increasing and readily available

experience of self as a consumer of those goods, and the
continuing, highly refined inducements of those interests
who stand to gain from that consumption have combined to
create a life-style and a concept of the public interest
which both see increasing consumption as an end in itself. “
"Cultural laissez faire" has not led to cultural
diversity, but as did its economic counterpart, a monopoly
^^This theme is a dominant one among philosophers
popular with environmentalists.
Theodore Roszak, Where
the Wasteland Ends (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books,
Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1973); Lewis Mumford, The
Myth of the Machine, 2 vols. (Harcourt Brace and World,
1967-70); Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1964).
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of highly consumptive v a l u e s . S o m e

have attempted to

defend the consumptive society by referring to ideals quite
similar to those of the 19th Century philosophers.

The

claim is that expanding consumptive opportunities "maximizes
individual c h o i c e . J .

K. Galbraith has appropriately

labelled such a claim as "the supermarket theory of
freedom."^**

Accepting its validity hinges on how one

answers the question of whether a society which offers a
wide variety of deodorants and automobile fashions objecti^^Christopher Lasch, The World of Nations (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), 293-296.
Lasch, in the final essay,
"The Limits of Cultural Laissez Faire," asks some probing
questions about the role of individual freedom in the context
of a technology which appears to be "eliminating" traditional
biological and social constraints.
The secular state and
individualism had two basic effects.
The assertion of
individual rights for privacy and against the traditional
constraints of institutionalized hierarchy.
"Individualism
. . . was identified with a revolt against the constraints
imposed by nature--that is, with m a n ’s increasing domination
of nature through science and technology. Modern rationalism
revealed itself not only in the rational state and in the
vision of a social order based on universal reason but in
the unprecedented advance of science; and in a culture which
placed a high value on privacy, self dependence and personal
fulfillment, it was perhaps inevitable that the achievements
of modern science should be seen, not as a new stage in man's
collective self awareness, but principally as another means
to individual fulfillment and the satisfaction of personal
wants."
^^See Max Ways, "How to Think About the Environment,"
Fortune 81 (February 1970) 98.
^‘‘John Kenneth Galbraith, "How Much Should a Country
Consume?" Readings in Resource Management and Conservation,
ed. Ian Burton and Robert W. Kates (Chicago and London:
The University of Chicago Press, 1965) 265.
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fies the kind of diversity envisioned by the ideal regarding
philosophers.
Due to the longstanding congruence of unlimited
consumption and the public interest the legitimacy of making
increased consumption an object of political controversy
is often overlooked.

In a community which holds a consensus

on the high value of consumption, increased material
abundance is only controversial because of its contribution
to pollution problems.

With the recent introduction to

public debate of the vision of a post-industrial society,
the prospect of "having enough" has become a considered
possibility.

Combined with the recognition by an increasing

number that many further increases in consumption might
actually work against a concept of the public interest which
calls for a diverse and challenging culture, it has become
a legitimate political question.

This is particularly true

in cases where increased consumption actively destroys
natural environments which can make a strong claim on that
concept.

A political community which ordinarily claims

value neutrality is hard-pressed to maintain that stance in
a case of conflicting, mutually exclusive concepts of the
public interest.
The argued need to rethink the longstanding commitment
to increase consumption carries additional weight when it is
considered that the desires for consumption are often offensive
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to the other ideal underlying want regarding institutions.
Many consumptive desires have not offered the reasoned
elaboration which "consumer sovreignty" was supposed to
promote.

Can an obsessively consumptive life-style honestly

be defended as "freely chosen by individual men" following
their own lights, who have had the opportunity to thoughtfully
consider and experience a wide variety of alternative
life-styles?

The increasingly contrived desire for many

"necessities" of a consumer society cannot be easily
defended as instrumental to more ultimate goals.

Much

modern consumption seems arbitrary and pointless and the
public's desire to increase consumption is not deserving of
reform preservationist's respect.

There is strong evidence

that the public has lost sight of the value of a morally
coherent desire, and a diverse, challenging society.

While

such charges are obviously sweeping, their refinement is
necessary, however, before a preservationist can legitimately
defend a claim that material demands on natural environments
should be left unsatisfied.
A moral position on preservation must do more than
explain its rejection of the opposing position.

It must also

explain the superiority of its own position and explain what
it means by "superior."
The principal objection that the reform preservationist
makes to the indifferent satisfaction of arbitrary consumptive

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

54

desires centers on the unnecessary development of natural
environments that satisfaction requires.

Developing those

environments diminishes the extent to which nature can be
left to pursue its own ends and results in a sense of
alienation from the natural world.
Reform ideals require that nature be left untouched
once it has been sufficiently developed to meet genuine
material needs.

This does not mean that any legitimate

public interests be sacrificed for the sake of the aspirations
of nature.

It does mean that all human interests requiring

the development of natural environments be measured against
an idealized concept of the public interest.

Once manipu

lation is seen as unnecessary to that end, it becomes
apparent that enlightened human aspirations and those of
undeveloped nature are congruent.

It is determined that it

better serves the pursuit of the public interest to allow
the nature in question to pursue its own ends, whatever those
ends might b e 
lt is their uniqueness which serves to define the
contribution of natural environments to the public interest
in the most rigorous sense.

Unlike the traditional view,

the goodness or value of natural environments does not
claim to stand apart from human needs.

Their goodness

^®William Leiss, Nature, Technology and Domination
(unpublished paper), p. 10.
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results from the unique opportunities a natural environment
provides for men to act out of a sense of obligation to
nature.

It is only when men recognize the rights of others,

both human and nonhuman, and act out of a sense of obligation
to those rights that they feel as whole moral beings.

In

the same sense that men are rewarded by allowing other men
the freedom to pursue ends that are capable of a reasoned
elaboration, we take a similar pleasure in respecting
nature's pursuit of her own ends.^®

This opportunity is

available in the context of a wilderness experience, in the
actual attempts of preservationists to save a natural
environment, in the respect and awe felt for the natural
phenomena encountered in day-to-day experiences, or in a
heightened awareness of the implications of one's habits on
the natural environment.

To the extent, for example, which

men overlook the potential congruence between the aspirations
of nature and morally coherent men, they lose sight of that
particular virtue of discriminant consumption.

The result

is a sense of alienation from their natural surroundings and
from their potential to act as moral beings.

Conversely,

to the extent that men recognize and experience the rewards
of the congruence between the aspirations of nature and of
morally coherent men, men strive to be less arbitrary and
more discriminant in their demands on her.
-^Laurence Tribe, "Ways Not to Think About Plastic
Trees: New Foundations for Environmental Law," The Yale Law
Journal 83 (1974) 1326-1327.
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The injunction is to treat nature responsibly, as a
distinct entity, not to actually speak for its aspirations.
Such an injunction does not require a mystical, bio-centric
or teleological view of nature.

It does require that men

treat nature as purposeful, as a distinct entity possessing
an inalienable right once the justified claims that have been
made on it have been satisfied.

That right is simply the

right to be left a l o n e . A f t e r that point nature need not
prove its material recreational or esthetic desirability to
men.

The onus is placed on men to prove the legitimacy of

human desires which require further development.
Acting out of a sense of responsibility towards nature
is an ideal which seems to summarize the hopes of many
environmentalists.

It explains the dismay of many preser

vationists when a natural area is left unprotected because
of a lack of scenic or recreational desirability.

It also

accounts for the appreciation a preservationist feels for
those natural environments he will probably never "use.”
Unfortunately, the tendency in a political community which
appeals to popular wants and is indifferent to the ideals
underlying those wants is to rationalize the preservation
of natural environments by referring only to their service
to popular values, such as their scenic beauty or their
^^Herbert Marcuse, Counterrevolution and Revolt (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1972) 63-69.
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recreational and research opportunities.
legitimate values in their own right.

All of those are

They overlook,

however, the reform ideal claiming a natural environment
has a value which gives the preservation of natural environ
ments a unique claim to the idealized concept of the public
interest.
The claim that a reform position on natural environments
makes on the traditional liberal concept of the public
interest is that natural environments possess a unique
ability to foster men who search for the ideals underlying
their desires.

They afford the opportunity for men to

develop a sense of moral responsibility, humility and
accountability for their actions, a sense which purely want
regarding institutions once promised to promote.
By meeting the requirements of a moral position, as
elaborated here, reform preservationist demands for a more
natural environment make a more legitimate claim to satis
faction than those apparently arbitrary consumptive wants
which have not been similarly elaborated.

Of the two

competing demands, only preservationist claims successfully
appeal to a concept of the public interest which demands that
all men's desires be capable of grounding in a moral position.
Merely requiring that all competing demands on natural
environments be capable of a reasoned elaboration is not a
very substantive concept of the public interest.

Obviously

more substantive ideals are required for resolving conflicting

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

58

legitimate demands.

The appeal of reform preservationists

for a more natural environment makes a strong claim to the
other basic ideal in the traditional liberal concept of the
public interest as well.

This ideal calls for a diverse and

challenging culture.
That ideal- has not been articulated in any substantive
way here, nor can it be in a paper of this scope.

It does

seem to be a fairly sound generalization to say that the
opportunities afforded by natural environments are varied
and challenging enough to greatly increase the diversity and
quality of American life-styles.

Their contribution

certainly seems greater than increased development for
consumptive demands.

In specific instances, however, a more

detailed description of the public interest is required.
Without such a description, a convincing case for preserving
a particular area is only left with rhetorical references to
those challenging and diverse experiences.
The earlier assertion that the further development of
natural environments is unnecessary to serve the public
interest demonstrates the need to go beyond merely referring
to "rewards" and "challenges" when extolling natural
environments.

How, for example, does one isolate one

particular development as unnecessary in an interdependent
economy?

Similarly, how does one readily distinguish

legitimate consumptive desires from arbitrary consumptive
desires?

Consumptive habits and "necessary" developments
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combine to make up a seamless web.

It is impossible to

question a particular habit or development without ulti
mately having to question a whole complex of habits and
developments.

It is impossible for preservationists to

attack the car culture for its displacement of farmland and
urban neighborhoods with freeways and parking lots without
opening up a variety of related issues.

What about the

needlessly large size of many cars, or their wasteful use,
or the urban sprawl which makes wasteful use of automobiles
a necessity?

Attacking the car culture also touches upon

the problem of those thousands whose employment is tied up
in its perpetuation.
The initial objection carries with it a series of
related controversies and with them comes the obligation to
make a consistent stand on issues such as mass transit,
urban planning and public works projects.
This same interdependent character of the economy
lends some validity to the charge that preservationists
are exacerbating social injustice.

It is not sufficient to

respond to the charge by pointing to the needlessly high
consumption of others.

Like the objection to the car

culture, the objection to needless consumption demands a
position on a wider program of social change which includes
a concern for social justice.^®
i®William Bryan, "Toward a Viable Environmental Movement,"
Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 10 (1974) 400-1.
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The above examples suggest that it is not a matter of
simply sloughing arbitrary consumption off the top of the
public's material requirements.

The challenge facing reform

preservationists and reform environmentalists is the
articulation of a comprehensive vision of the public interest.
This vision must distinguish between necessary and arbitrary
consumption and necessary and unnecessary developments.

It

can only do so by developing accessible social, political
and economic alternatives combined into a coherent vision
of the public interest that would enable such distinctions
to be readily made.
Appealing to such a non-want regarding concept of the
public interest showing both why and how current consumption
patterns should be shifted to those which have a much lower
material requirement.

Education, health services, sanitary

services, good parks and playgrounds, the fine arts, effective
local government and a clean countryside, for example, appear
to be viable, promising alternatives which have low materials
requirements.

Of course, the alternatives must also show

how those goals and the mechanisms employed in achieving
them are consistent with traditional liberal ideals, ideals
which rely heavily on the autonomy of the individual.
From a technical point of view, such a task is a major
one.

From the point of view of a moral position, it's an

absolute necessity.

Failing to develop and promote any
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practical alternatives to excess consumption, development
and social injustice casts doubt on the reform preser
vationists' claims of not acting selfishly but in the public
interest.

It also suggests that reform preservationist

goals, even if correct in principle, are not realizable in
fact.
If the preservationist position were integrated with
accessible alternatives to current practices, the myopia of
describing the alternatives as wilderness for the rich versus
housing for the poor would be exposed.

From the perspective

of a reform concept of the public interest, the want
regarding alternative means a more opulent abundance of
needless goods, and a less natural environment.

The reform

alternatives would offer a more natural environment and a
more equitable distribution of previously developed resources.
This brief elaboration of the preservationist position
makes an appeal to a coherent moral theory, and undercuts
the morality of the position of those opposed to preservation,
or whose consumptive appetites preclude preservation.

The

discussion also gives a broad outline of the kinds of
arguments and alternatives which must be developed for a
legitimate liberal defense of "excess" preservation.
In addition to a reasoned elaboration which is capable
of appealing to a concept of the public interest, a second
requirement of a moral position on preservation is consistency.
It is the preservationists' public image in this dimension
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which frequently places the integrity of their position in
jeopardy, and has precipitated many of the objections to
their efforts.
The preservationist position only commands respect
when it is grounded in a life-style which does not itself
make needless demands on natural environments.

It seems

fair to expect that one willingly lead the kind of life he
is advocating for others.

It is understandable, of course,

that preservationists might see such individual efforts as
of little practical worth.

The integrity of one's position

is of little importance in a political tradition which
satisfies wants indifferently.

Additionally, the seamless

web described above makes the pursuit of a morally consistent
life, from an environmental point of view, very difficult.
It is nearly impossible to function in an environmentally
consistent manner in the context of a culture which is
oblivious to environmental constraints.

Nevertheless, it's

incumbent on anyone who proposes ending needless development
that he attempt to live and search for ways to live an
environmentally responsible life.

Not to do so belies a

position asserting that an obligation to nature inspires
morally coherent men.
If preservationists would become more concerted in
their efforts to carve out distinctive life-styles, the
charge that they were elitists who imposed their interests
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upon rights of others would be more easily countered.

It

would be more accurate to describe preservationists as an
oppressed minority.

The self perpetuating, unchecked

consumptive imperative develops natural environments in the
process of appealing to a majoritarian concept of the
public interest which the reform environmentalists do not
share.

If one's life style were consistent with calls for

a more natural environment, one need admit no benefit from
increased development of those environments.

As a result,

no genuinely public interest would be promoted.

Majority

ideals would be promoted at the expense of minority ideals.
The above is not a direct response to the charge of
cultural elitism.
paternalistic.
exotic.

Reform environmentalists are avowedly

But the ideals being appealed to are hardly

They are rooted in the same liberal tradition which

produced the institutions allowing unchecked consumption.
If those ideals were consulted, the demand for equal
respect by consumptive interests would be seen as mitigated
by their increasingly arbitrary character.
forfeit their right to full respect.

As such they

Those who accept

those traditional ideals naturally find oppressive the
resolution of an issue which accepts consumptive desires as
equally legitimate.
The above is the usual result of preservation vs.
development disputes in the context of political institutions
which are essentially want regarding and do not require an
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appeal to a distinct concept of the public interest.

In

such a context, the desires of preservatonists are seen as
just another "consumptive desire" placed upon a dwindling
natural resource base.

The number of natural environments

preserved is not based on their superior claim to an
institutionalized concept of the public interest but is
simply a function of the number of natural environments the
public wants preserved vis a vis its consumptive desires.
For example, the public's desires for preservation were
expressed through the passage of the Wilderness Act, the
ensuing wilderness bills, and through agencies duly author
ized to administer such environments.
Since the value of protecting natural environments
does not exist independently of public desires for them,
the onus is on preservationists to prove to the larger
public and its representatives the value of preservation in
each particular instance.

As a result, preservationist

efforts have necessarily been piecemeal, and also, due to
the constant widespread demands of expanding consumption,
spread rather thin.^®
The lack of institutionalized recognition of the
values of preserving natural environments has also placed
limits on the kinds of legal objections that can be made to
^®Michael McCloskey, "Wilderness Movement at the Cross
roads, 1945-1970," Pacific Historical Review 41 (1972) 355.
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the outcome of a legislative or administrative decision.
In the past, these objections have been directed at the
unsound decision-making procedures employed by natural
resource administrators.^®

In other instances the objections

have centered on the neglect of relevant information^^
and in others the neglect of a substantive statute (NEPA).^^
The principle to which the contending parties appeal in
each of the above disputes is want regarding.

Have logging

interests been given too much influence on the legislators
or the administrative agency?**

Is the public fully and

accurately informed about the impact of a proposed develop
ment?***

Are national interests being overlooked in an

effort to accommodate local pressures?**

If every possible

step has been taken to make certain that the number of natural
*“Charles S. Reich, "The Public and the Nation's
Forests," California Law Review 50 (1962) 381, 386.
Reich
discusses the need for increasing public input in land
management decisions to offset input of the commodity
interests which are established through working relation
ships with those agencies, infra note 23.
*iSierra Club v. Butz ELR III 20, 292, 20, 293 (9th
Cir Mar. 16, 1973).
Plaintiff offered court information
supporting alternative uses.
**42 use §4321 et. seq., 83 stat. 852, Pub. L.
91-190.
See note 24.
2 3

Supra, note 20,

**‘The goal of NEPA is more procedural than substantive,
The act simply requires that environmental factors be
considered.
It does not assign a weight to such factors.
**See Grant McConnel's "The Conservation Movement,
Past and Present," Western Political Quarterly 7 (1954)
472-3.
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environments preserved is an accurate reflection of existing
public desires, appeals to the want regarding principle have
been exhausted.
If one's valuation of a natural environment is higher
than that of the general public's, it is unlikely that any
of the above disputes will result in wholly satisfactory
outcomes from the preservationist point of view.

The

apprehensions of many preservationists about relying on a
highly consumptive public to adequately support their
efforts is reflected in their recent attempts at conceptu
alizing a constitutional right to a salubrious environment,
or as Christopher Stone has suggested, granting legal rights
to natural objects.**

Recognizing such a right protects ah

ideal that is implicitly "too important to be left to the
vagaries of the majority will."**
Various intellectual paths have been followed towards
such a conceptualization.

The hypothetical position

constructed here claims natural environments are protected
through the projection of the private rights of preserva
tionists onto those natural environments.

The reform

preservation claim is that those areas are not merely
instrumental to more ultimate private ideals, such as
*^Christopher Stone, "Should Trees Have Standing?-Towards Legal Rights for Natural Objects," Southern Cali
fornia Law Review 45 (1972) 450.
**"Notes Towards a Constitutionally Protected Environ
ment," Virginia Law Review 41, 458 (1970) 481.
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recreation or aesthetic appeal, but are the embodiment of
their own obligation to nature.

The claim might be that

natural areas deserve protection under the due process
clause of the 14th Amendment by virtue of meeting the
"personal" and "fundamental" requirements established in
earlier cases defining such rights.^®
The ramification of recognizing such a right would be
to shift the burden of proof from preservationists to those
advocating development.

Remaining natural environments

could only be developed if sufficient public reasons were
elaborated to justify overriding a private right to
preservation.^ ®
Although claiming such a right might seem rather
ambitious, if preservationists met the consistency requirement
of a moral position in a visible way and were more vocal
about the sense of obligation underlying their efforts, i.e.,
made a reasoned elaboration, making such a claim would not
be presumptuous.

Courts have been more willing to accept

^®Ibid., pp. 462-3.
"Under the substantive due process
approach . . . a constitutional right that is solidly
grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment must be both personal
and fundamental.
The personality requirement is designed
to prevent economic rights from regaining the constitutional
status they enjoyed earlier in the century.
In 'Griswold,'
Justice Horton averred that the fundamentality of a due
process right is determined by deference to history, our
basic societal values, and the doctrines of federalism and
separation of powers.
Similarly, Goldberg said that
unenumerated constitutional rights must be so rooted in the
traditions and [collective] conscience of our people . . .
as to be ranked fundamental."
2 9

Ibid., p . 478.
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such nascent claims to rights in cases where a minority's
ability to protect such a claimed right is vulnerable.

As

an identifiable minority preservationists could not protect
their rights, i.e., natural environments, through recourse
to legislative and executive channels.

Yet those minority

interests would obviously be suffering harm from developments
which only serve majority ideals.**
The reform position and its concomitant actions outlined
here would provide a legitimate defense of the supposedly
excessive efforts of preservationists.

The earlier

criticisms of preservationists remain quite appropriate,
however, for the traditional defenders of natural environments.
There is a glaring inconsistency in leading the dominant
conception of the good life and still advocating the
preservation of areas which contain material resources.
Preservation has historically been associated with those who
combine a desire for outdoor recreation with a highly
consumptive life-style.

From the reform perspective,

treating the desires of such advocates as mere incremental
consumptive desires is justified.

Unlike those of the reform

environmentalists such desires cannot be coherently integrated
with a life-style which is consistent with a more natural
environment or linked with a program of social and economic
reform.
3 0

Perhaps that mystical tradition in which wilderness
Ibid., p. 482.
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proponents claim to speak for nature and its desires, and
not for their own, is a reflection of that inability.
an arbitrary defense does not command respect.
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CHAPTER V
THE ROLE OF PRESERVATION IN A
MOVEMENT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL REFORM
It is now possible to reevaluate the role of preser
vation in the larger environmental movement.

Environ

mentalists who appeal to a want regarding concept of the public
interest are naturally eager to chastise and disassociate
themselves from preservationists who seem to impede the
implementation of the public will.

A culturally prescriptive

environmentalist who sees a more natural environment as a
justified end independent of the public will should not be
troubled by this.

There is a possibility that continued

efforts at preserving those environments and the dissociation
from want regarding and survivalist environmentalism it brings
may prove to be one key to a viable movement for environmental
reform.
The conflict of the distinctly different concepts of
the public interest observed when analyzing the exchanges
over natural environments is less obvious when one reviews
other environmental issues.

At first glance, a reform

oriented or prescriptive environmental community distinct
from other environmentalists is not readily discernible.
Except for the well known differences in emphasis between
Barry Commoner and Paul Ehrlich, the environmental movement
presents a remarkably united front, free of crippling dissent
-70-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

71

and confident that the future will vindicate its actions.
Yet the philosophical distinctions that preservation
controversies put into relief are important and should be
the object 6f more discussion within the movement.

What

kind of future does the environmentalist hope for?

Does

his role include advocating future goals?

Is environmentalism

a movement to promote a change in the way the public lives,
or is it simply a problem-solving movement which hopes to
minimize the degree to which the general public's life-style
might have to change?

Even in the exchanges over natural

environments, where confronting the differences within the
environmental movement and the questions those differences
raise seems unavoidable, the misdirected defenses of
preservationists show a lack of selfconsciousness about the
various goals that are implicit.

For environmentalists who

are not interested in promoting new values, glossing over
these internal differences is not damaging.

It's hard to

imagine a successful movement for cultural change, however,
whose members are not cognizant of their own unique ideals.
There are assorted reasons for reform environmentalism's
lack of selfconsciousness.

There are, for example, obvious

psychological benefits to seeing oneself as riding the crest
of popular sentiment.

But though the environmental movement

is in part a popular movement, it contains elements which
are something more than that as well.

"Environmentalists"

implies a group with a distinct set of values to most of the
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public.

However distorted an image that label might conjure

up for some, its use does seem to suggest that public
opinion and environmentalists' opinions are occasionally
at variance.
Additionally, claiming one's displeasure with majority
values is not strategically sound in a society that is
democratic and equalitarian in temper.

American history

shows that those who have assumed paternalistic positions
on controversial issues have not fared well politically.^
The danger of admitting a paternalistic position becomes
particularly evident when one considers the kinds of demands
made by reform ideals.

The kind of life-style one leads

and the kind of goods one consumes have never been considered
legitimate public concerns.

Attempts at changing public

life-styles are not likely to be well received.

Environ

mentalists and the general public both tend to see such
questions as matters to be resolved outside the political
sphere.

An avowedly paternalistic environmentalism runs the

risk of provoking charges that they constitute an elitist
minority interfering with private concerns.
There are other circumstances contributing to the
failure of reform environmentalists to set themselves apart
^For a comprehensive view of the dangers of paternalism,
see Richard Hofstadder, Anti Intellectualism in American
Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969) ; also see Brian
Barry's discussion of the "anti-ideals in politics" temper
of American culture in Political Argument (New York;
Humanities Press, 1965) 80-1.
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from less visionary elements.

One is that both reform and

want regarding environmentalists share short-run goals.
Although the reform branch of the movement does not share
the want regarding environmentalist's respect for the public’s
consumptive aspirations, it does collaborate with those
environmentalists on most issues.

The general public, the

want regarding and the reform environmentalist are all
convinced that a safer technology and improved pollution
control devices must be developed.
remain under control.

Population growth must

If subdivisions are going to be

developed, they should be well planned.

The long-term

productivity of the land must not be impaired.

The ecolo

gical sciences must be more thoroughly explored.

None of

these goals are terribly controversial, all are very
important and must be achieved.

They satisfy the demands

of the general public and are also consistent with the ideals
of the reform environmentalist.

But by not pointing to the

existence of divergent ultimate goals, i.e., continuing
consumption and continued development v.s. more discriminant
consumption and a more natural environment, these issues
tend to obscure the difference between popular and pre
scriptive environmentalism.

And when the short-range goals

of environmental action are agreed upon the problems are
often seen as mere technical problems, as developing the
best means to the end of those shared goals.

But the problems

then tend to be diagnosed and solved only in want regarding
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terms, i.e., lack of scientific and economic information,
technical failures, administrative incompetence, none of
which hint at the existence of the larger issue, which is
the nature of the "wants" themselves.

As a result, an

awareness of the important distinction between acting in
response to public demands and out of an obligation to
reform ideals is blurred.

OT course the general public and

the want regarding environmentalist feel that resolving the
above problems is the whole of environmentalism.

For the

reformer, as we have seen, simply giving the public what it
wants does not complete his areas of concern.

He is also

interested in advancing more ultimate goals.
The problem of developing a more selfconscious reform
community cannot be resolved by its withdrawal from those
less controversial environmental problems which are shared
with want regarding environmentalists and by focusing on
long-range goals.

The reform community also has a stake in

the solution of those immediate problems, a stake which may
extend to its own prospects for survival.

Remaining

ideologically pure may be romantically attractive, but in
this instance it might also prove lethal; only advocating
more ultimate ideals holds little prospect for immediate
success.
This should not be construed to be a retreat to a
survivalist position.

In fact, one cause of reform

environmentalism's weak prescriptive voice might be the

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

75

prevailing assumption within much of the environmental
movement that value change will take care of itself, that
the physical fact of a resource shortage or an eco
catastrophe, either imminent or unfolding, will bring the
consuming masses, pernicious technologies and market
economies to their knees.

While an eco-disaster would no

doubt be an effective way to show the superiority of reform
ideals, it's hardly an event to hope for.
made an opposite assumption.

This paper has

Its assumption has been that

the environmental problems which pose immediate threats
are solvable in the short run and that our first eco-catastrophe may be postponed "indefinitely" without requiring
a change in consumptive values.

This assumption does not

reflect a cavalier disregard for the "ecological facts of
life," but a fear that the public's environmental attention
span will not extend far into the future, coupled with a
respect for the short-run competency of the technological
fix.2
If this assumption is legitimate, immediate environ
mental problems will be "solved," and the popular environ
mental movement will become history.
status of reform environmentalism?

What will then be the
Reform environmentalists

will have no choice but to wage the contest on less popular
^The Club of Rome, for example, recently extended the
time frame in which adequate response can be made to
environmental threats.
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grounds, on the strength of their reform ideals vis a vis
dominant ideals.

It is difficult to imagine the reform

environmentalists succeeding in even entering such a debate,
unless they become more of a community of consciously
shared goals than the controversy over preservation suggests
them to be.
The preservation of natural environments might play a
role in crystalizing such a community.

Preservation's

potentially strategic role is best illustrated through a
review of past political attempts at changing American
values.

From a reform perspective, a review of the pattern

those movements have followed is not encouraging.
Culturally prescriptive movements have suffered from many
of the same difficulties highlighted in the above discussion.
Populism, Progressivism, the New Deal, the civil rights
movement, and the recent antiwar movement all contained
elements which could be classified as culturally prescriptive,
reform and popular.

In all cases, the reform elements were

frustrated and virtually disappeared.
Past movements have been very "successful" in a
distributive sense.

They have provided the opportunity for

economically disaffected groups to enter the mainstream of
America's dominant cultural values.

These movements have

never succeeded, however, in altering those dominant values.
An environmentalist might, in fact, argue that the reform
tradition has served to aggravate the environmental
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problems we are now facing by extending consumptive values
to the disaffected groups.*

It is not the purpose of this

paper to explain how these movements eventually extended
dominant American values, however, but to understand why
their more visionary elements made such feeble, short
lived efforts at preserving and extending their reform
values and goals.
Nineteenth Century populism provides a particularly
informative example of past failures at sustained political
attempts to change values.

The populist movement of the

19th Century combined the inchoate indignation of farmers
and laborers at the chronic poverty of the expanding urbanindustrial culture with reform elements who envisioned a
future culture for farmers and laborers radically different
from the one which was developing.”

The source of much of

the discontent was a farm population whose once significant
cultural influence and self esteem had eroded as the nation
^Hans Ezhenbergher, "Critique of Political Ecology,"
New Left Review (March April 1974) 10; also Richard
Hoftstadder, The Age of Reform (New York: Vintage Books,
1955} 18. "It has been the function of the liberal tradition
in American politics, from the time of Jefferson and
Jacksonian democracy down through Populism, Progressivism
and the New Deal to broaden the numbers of those who could
benefit from the great American bonanza . . . without this
tradition . . . the American system would probably have
failed to develop into the remarkable system of production
and distribution that it is."
“Christopher Lasch, The Agony of the American Left (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969) 5-7.
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became urbanized.

When severe economic difficulties became

widespread in the last quarter of the century, this unrest
developed into the grange movements, and later, the Peoples
Party.

The immediate targets of the generalized anger were

railroads, urban banks, and nearly anything or anyone that
seemed to suggest a retreat from traditional rural values or
as somehow responsible for farmers' economic problems.

The

rapid growth of industrialism created a disaffected urban
laboring class as well.

Poor working conditions were an

inevitable product of the fiercely competitive entrepreneurial
capitalism of the period.

Urban areas, growing at an

incredibly rapid pace, contained immigrant labor class slums
as squalid as any racial ghettos found in a twentieth
century city.^
The disaffection of laborer and farmer occasionally
extended beyond their concern with the immediate economic
problems to a more detailed critique of middle class values
and institutions.

Henry George* and Edward Bellamy?

suggested radical institutional changes and a utopian future
which inspired many Populists.

The Peoples Party included

elements for whom feminism, socialism, and coalitions of
*Ibid., pp. 5-7.
*Henry George, Progress and Poverty (New York: Robert
Schalkenbach Foundation, 75th anniv. ed., 1956).
?Edward Bellamy, Looking Backward 2000-1887 (Boston
and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1898).
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poor black and poor white farmers were important concerns.
In rural areas the ultimate hope of the reform element was
to restore the Jeffersonian ideal of the independent, selfreliant, noncommercial yeoman farmer, while in urban areas
the "Knights of Labor" leadership was:
. . . holding out for a comprehensive rather than a
piecemeal reform of society, [attacking] economic
individualism . . ., the morally corrupting effects of
capitalism, and [holding an] underlying vision of a
cooperative society.®
Unfortunately for the reform elements the plans for
instituting these ideals were never well developed.
Although the literature of agrarian reform was replete with
predictions of the inevitable failure of the decadent urban
industrial society, practical steps to an alternative
society were rarely developed.

Elements of the labor

movement were confident that the inexorable forces of history
would lead to the realization of their ideals.

The assumption,

apparently, was that reform ideals would fill the vacuum
when the dominant society collapsed.®
The want regarding elements of the Populist movement
which grew out of the discontent were not far-sighted, nor
were they apocalyptic.

They focussed their efforts on

effecting the public's immediate demands.

The Farm Bureau

®Lasch, The Agony of the American Left, 12-13, 16-17.
’For a general discussion of the decline of Agrarian
®For
F
Reform and Populism,
see Richard Hoftstadter's Age of Reform.
Chapter III.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

80

cared little for reforming society in general.
goal was to solve farmers' economic problems.

Its only
Samuel

Gompers' American Federation of Labor was not concerned
with questions of class solidarity or with establishing a
a cooperative society, but with the more immediate concerns
of better working conditions and wages.
Reforms which increased economic opportunities for
farmers and laborers were relatively uncontroversial and
could be politically and economically achieved with relative
ease.

Concerns such as preserving a traditional rural

culture or the sense of community cooperation which the
Knights of Labor hoped for were not traditionally deemed
political or public concerns.

These goals, unlike economic

concerns, were traditionally private matters and not readily
accessible through political action.

The want regarding

elements of Populism passed those concerns over while
resolving popular, less controversial issues.
In retrospect, it might be argued that the Populist
movement was a great success.

Farmers and laborers have

become economic interest groups who claim substantial
portions of the gross national product.

Improved farming

and marketing techniques and technological advances in
industry have allowed the absorption of farmer and laborer
into the economic mainstream.
10

Such a happy conclusion

Lasch, The Agony of the American Left, 16-18
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would only be justified, however, if one accepts the analysis
of a liberal historian that all the Populists wanted was
"more of the good things in life--the American standard of
living as it was known in [that] day." ^ ^

But judged by the

more ultimate goals of the reform elements of the Populist
movement, the outcome was terribly disappointing.

Modern

corporate agribusiness does not bring to mind the Jeffer
sonian ideal of the independent family farm.

Organized

labor is hardly in the vanguard of social change.

The

purpose of this discussion is not, however, to sympathize
with reform goals, or decry the eventual impact of these
reform movements on the environment.

The relevant question

asks, what happened to the reform elements and their ideals?
Once the immediate, uncontroversial, popular goals
were met, public indignation and interest ended.

The

potential grassroots support for reform ideals died with
the end of the more immediate issues.
impulse died internally as well.

Secondly, the reform

Although reform ideals had

not been politically effected, they had not been precluded
either.

No actions had been taken by the political community

to destroy labor’s "community," or the farmer’s rural
cultural traditions.

The ideal of selfsufficiency appeared

to remain an achievable one.

It could even have been

argued that through enhancing the farmers’ and laborers'
*^Richard Hoftstadter, Age of Reform, 130.
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material situation, their prospect of achieving those ideals
had been advanced.
The end of popular discontent had a disastrous effect
on the reform elements.

They had banked on a general

collapse of dominant ideals rather than on developing
accessible alternatives to those ideals.
The impact of these new conditions on reform elements
was that their liklihood of rapidly gaining enough converts
to reform ideals to make them political issues was slim.
And without the impetus of impaired self interest the reform
elements lacked the sense of indignation and hence the
shared commitment which could survive the long period such
a task required.
When the environmental movement gained national
prominance on Earth Day, 1970, one of its members happily
announced that, unlike past reform movements whose goals
were of an economic nature and could easily be co-opted,
environmentalism's noneconomic goals were not so readily
t w i s t e d . S u c h optimism is ungrounded from a reform point
of view.

The reform branch of the environmental movement

should not only be concerned about co-option, but also
accommodation.

Want regarding environmentalism, by not

actively questioning America's economic goals, is absorbed
by default and technologically and administratively
i*Dennis Hayes, "Earth Day: A Beginning," The Pro
gressive 34 (April 1970), 7.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

83

accommodated.

The public's goals for the environmental

movement are within reach.

There are indications that air

and water pollution have both decreased over the past
year.The

subdividing of rural land may soon by

"properly planned."

Population growth is no longer a

national problem.
Once the public's immediate concerns are assuaged,
and confrontations over consumptive life-styles avoided,
the reform environmentalist will lack a potential consti
tuency for his more ultimate ideals.

Nor will he be able

to claim that his own life-style is precluded by the
consumption of others.

Once effective pollution controls

are instituted, the environment becomes "clean" and the
gross national product can again safely rise, the reform
environmentalist will be free to return to private life
and consume as discriminantly as he sees fit.

Consumptive

life-styles will no longer be the object of popular concern.
The EPA can then join the ICC and FDA in the ranks of selfperpetuating bureaucracies which are indifferent to the
ideals that contributed to their founding.
The demise of the commitment and sense of community
of reform populists, and the hypothetical demise of the
reform environmentalists resulted from two key circumstances.
The public's immediate, short-run demands were met, thus
**The Sixth Annual Report of the Council on Environ
mental Quality (December 1975) 299, 350.
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making more ultimate, traditionally private goals difficult'
to politicize.

Secondly, the reform communities suffered

from an inarticulateness which stemmed, in part, from the
fact that their self interest had not been impaired
and from the lack of a sense of shared ideals.
There are several reasons for believing that the
preservation branch of the environmental movement will not
allow a similar pattern.

Controversies over our remaining

natural environments, however, are likely to continue to
be prominent issues, issues which are not buried in
traditionally private spheres but are unavoidably public.
The number of conflicting demands of preservationists
and consumptive interests on the remaining natural areas is
constantly increasing.

Unlike the demands of the Populists

or the demands of those opposing pollution the competing
demands on natural environments are made upon a fixed,
finite resource base, which can't be technologically expanded
or administratively resolved.

As long as these competing,

mutually exclusive demands are made and the issue is not
fully resolved, the dialogue over the merits of the
competing demands will continue.
A mutually satisfactory solution cannot be achieved
through compromise since there are simply not enough natural
^‘‘Grant McConnel, "The New Politics of Conviction,"
Nation 206 (April 8, 1968) 475-76. McConnel discusses the
physical inability of preservation disputes to be resolved
through tradeoffs and compromises.
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environments left.

As long as the self interests of reform

environmentalists in regard to preservation of natural
environments cannot be satisfied, the ideals by which they
justify that interest will be kept firmly in mind.

The

problem cannot be misdiagnosed as one of administrative
incompetence, or an inefficient use of natural areas.

It

is obvious that no matter how competently the land is
administered, or how efficiently it is used, the root of
the problem, in the eyes of the reform community, will be
the dominant culture’s excessive material demands.
Additionally, the political community will be hard-pressed
to claim a neutral stance on the issue.

Every government

action which tends to promote increased development of
resources found in natural areas will not be seen as an
action that is neutral with respect to ultimate ends, but
will be viewed by reform environmentalists as promoting
increasingly contrived consumptive "needs" at the expense of
the realization of their own concept of the public interest.
In keeping with the tradition of falling back on
technological expansion to satisfy the demands of all
interests, it has recently been seriously suggested that,
since the public's desire for natural environments is
learned, it might be possible to teach the public to appreci
ate artificial environments.^^

This would enable the nation

isMartin H. Krieger, "What's Wrong With Plastic
Trees?", Science 179, p. 446.
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to continue its present pace of developing natural environ
ments while satisfying "amenity" interests as well.

What

such a purely want regarding "solution" overlooks, of course,
is the reform rationale for preserving natural areas out of
a sense of obligation to nature itself, not simply because
of their aesthetic or recreational "desirability."
It may seem odd that the key contribution preservation
controversies make to reform environmentalism is their
inability to be satisfactorily resolved.

That assertion

can be understood if one remembers that the reform environ
mentalist who takes his own ideals seriously sees himself
as a morally prescriptive force and not a mere selfish
interest who is only concerned about executing his own
life plans.

The purpose of a prescriptive movement is to

force a confrontation, dialogue, and choice about the
competing social goals.

This is what controversies involving

natural areas uniquely succeed in doing.
Preservation controversies are easily politicized.
In the past reform elements have never been able to build
the political base necessary to make their more ultimate
ideals a matter of public choice.

Populist ideals about

ostensibly "private" concerns such as rural culture and
community solidarity could only have been politicized had
large numbers pressed those demands.

Preservation contro

versies do not have to overcome that hurdle.

Since many of
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our remaining natural environments are under public owner
ship, the competing ideals are already matters of public
choice.

Unlike most traditional ideals, reform ideals on

nature are physically, publically objectified.

The public

is given a choice between uninterrupted consumption and a
more natural environment.

As a result, both dominant and

reform concepts of the public interest are held up for
public review.

The issue of what kind of life is the best

kind of life remains a legitimate public question.
The fact that preservation has already become the
object of controversy within the environmental movement
seems to add weight to the above argument.

It seems to

serve as a potential watershed between reform and want
regarding environmentalism.

Unlike pollution control it is

a soluble problem only in a political community in which all
accept the legitimacy of other interests and all are willing
to equally share "resources" with other interests.

Obviously,

there now exist those who have examined their vision of
the future, decided they cannot respect or accept such a
resolution, and are continuing to agitate for preserving the
remaining natural environments.

The preservation of natural

environments is likely to remain such a watershed as long as
there exist those who treasure such an environment.
This is not a claim that continued appeals for the
preservation of natural environments insures the success of
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reform environmentalisra.

Preservation controversies simply

provide a common touchstone by which reform environmentalists
might remain aware of the goals they serve, and the
existence of others who share these goals.

A sense of

belonging to such a community of shared values and threatened
interests is necessary impetus for the development and
promotion of practical environmental alternatives.
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